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THE 2004 ORGAN DONATION RECOVERY
AND IMPROVEMENT ACT: HOW CONGRESS
MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY TO SAY "YES" TO




In the past twenty years a significant and increasing number of
patients have turned to organ transplantation as a means of
overcoming life-jeopardizing organ failure.! While a sizeable number
of individuals receive organ transplants each year,2 the demand for
available organs exceeds the supply, as there are currently over 90,000
individuals on the transplant waiting list.3 In 2003, the waiting list for
cadaveric (deceased) donor transplants increased at more than twice
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1. Jennifer L. Hurley, Note, Cashing In on the Transplant List: An Argument
Against Offering Valuable Compensation for the Donation of Organs, 4 J. HIGH
TECH L. 117 (2004). The increased success and demand for organ transplantation
is attributable to the discovery and introduced use of Cyclosporine, an immuno-
suppressive drug that reduces the incidence of organ rejection. Id. See also S. REP.
No. 98-382, at 13 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3979
("Associated factors in the growing interest in organ transplantation have been
remarkable improvements in morbidity and mortality of patients undergoing organ
transplantation, due to improved techniques and the development of
immunosuppressive medications which reduce the incidence of rejection of the
transplanted organs.").
2. Friedrich Port et al., Trends and results for Organ Donation and
Transplantation in the United States, 2004, 5 (Part 2) AM. J. TRANSPLANT 843
(2005) ("During 2003, more than 25,000 organs were transplanted in the United
States - over 18,000 from deceased donors and almost 7,000 from living donors...
transplants by 2.2% overall...").
3. United Network for Organ Sharing Online, http://www.unos.org (last
visited Jan. 15, 2005).
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the rate of the number of transplants.4 Unfortunately, in the same
year, more than 7,000 patients reportedly died while awaiting a
transplant.5
The organ shortage is costing the lives of patients in need of kidney
transplants, because the waiting list for this population is growing at a
rate of 3,000-4,000 patients per year.6  African-Americans
disproportionately suffer the effects of the organ shortage as they
comprise thirty-six percent of the patients listed in need of a kidney,
three times their percentage of the general population
The success of transplantation in the United States currently
depends upon a system of altruistic organ donation from living or
cadaveric (deceased) donors. 8 Living donors have been a substantial
and steadily increasing source of organs and have exceeded the
number of cadaveric donors since 2001. 9 However, the rate of increase
in living donors has slowed since 2000.0 In view of the slowing growth
in living organ donation and growing size of the transplant waiting list,
4. Port et al., supra note 2 at 843. In 2003, the waiting list increased by 5.1%
versus a 1.9% increase in the number of transplants. Id.
5. Id.
6. Gabriel Danovitch et al., Trends and Results for Organ Donation and
Transplantation in the United States, 1994-2003, 5 (Part 2) AM. J. TRANSPLANT.
904, 905 (2005).
7. Id. at 905. While the length of time patients wait to receive a kidney has
steadily increased for all patients, the increase in time to transplant has been
greatest among African Americans who, for those listed in 1999, waited more than
twice as long as whites. Id. at 906. This enhanced waiting list burden on African
Americans has been due in part to low donation rates among African Americans
resulting in antigen mismatching between donors and recipients. Peter Ubel et al.,
Pennsylvania's Voluntary Benefits Program: Evaluating an Innovative Proposal for
Increasing Organ Donation, 19(5) HEALTH AFFAIRS 206 (2000). This disparity in
time to transplant burdening African Americans may be reduced due to changes in
national organ allocation policy de-emphasizing the importance of human
leukocyte antigen (HLA) matching. Danovitch et al., supra note 6 at 906.
However, it is important to note that African Americans who benefit from this
policy by receiving mismatched organs previously unavailable may nonetheless
experience poorer transplant outcomes as the degree of HLA mismatch has been
shown to have some effect on 5-year graft survival outcomes. Id. at 909.
8. Julie T. Sanford & Judith T. Rocchiccioli, Cash for Kidneys: The Use
Financial Incentives for Organ Donation, 4(4) POLICY, POLITICS, & NURSING
PRACTICE 275, 276 (2003).
9. Francis L. Delmonico et al., Organ Donation and Utilization in the United
States, 2004, 5 (Part 2) AM. J. TRANSPLANT. 862, 864 (2005).
10. Id.
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increasing weight is being placed on cadaveric donors to serve as a
substantial source for transplantable organs.
Unfortunately, of the estimated number of individuals eligible to
become cadaveric donors each year, in the range of 10,500-13,800, a
much smaller number of these individuals actually become donors."
Frequently, eligible cadaveric donors fail to become actual donors
because family members do not grant consent when approached.1 2 For
Caucasian families, between 1997-2002, consent for donation was
granted only sixty-one percent of the time when requested, and for
African-American families, the consent rate was dramatically lower,
with consent given only thirty-four percent of the time. 3
Confronted with this persistent health crisis in organ donation, the
108th Congress responded in 2004 by passing the Organ Donation and
Recovery Improvement Act. 4  Congress sought to promote organ
donation by enacting measures to enhance public awareness,
reimburse costs associated with living-donor organ donation, and
improve the organ procurement system.'5 However, Congress failed to
adopt provisions that could have opened the door to an innovative
alternative to the current singular reliance on altruism: financial
incentives for organ donation.
Part I of this Comment will examine the National Organ Transplant
Act, the current federal law standing in the way of financial incentives
for organ donation by prohibiting the exchange of organs for valuable
consideration. Part II will address how Congress missed an
opportunity in 2004 to explore financial incentives for organ donation,
first, by failing to authorize demonstration projects utilizing financial
incentives in cadaveric organ donation, and second, by failing to clearly
define the scope of the federal prohibition on the exchange of organs
for valuable consideration. Part III will discuss how federal law has
inhibited Pennsylvania's effort to respond to the organ shortage by
11. Id. at 863, 867 ("The last decade has seen a steady increase in the number
of deceased organ donors, from 5099 donors in 1994 to 5985 donors in 2000, and
then to 6455 in 2003..."). However, this increase in cadaveric donation has not
kept pace with the demand for organs as cadaver organ recovery only increased by
fifteen percent from 1992-2002. Robert Arnold et al., Financial Incentives for
Cadaver Organ Donation: An Ethical Reappraisal, 73(8) TRANSPLANTATION 1361,
1366 (2002).
12. Delmonico, supra note 9, at 865.
13. Id. at 865-66.
14. Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-216
(2004).
15. See id.
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increasing cadaveric organ donation through the use of incentives in
the form of funeral benefits to donor family members. Finally, Part IV
will discuss how the use of funeral benefits is an acceptable companion
to altruism, and is workable within the framework of federal law for
four reasons. First, it upholds a recognized legal interest family
members have in providing a decent burial for their deceased loved
ones; second, it serves an important state interest in potentially
remedying the serious shortage of organs for transplantation; third, it
does not involve a commerce in living-donor organs, contemplated by
the drafters of federal law when prohibiting the exchange of organs for
valuable consideration; and fourth, it is not exploitative, as it actually
serves the interest of minority communities.
The National Organ Transplant Act
In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act
(NOTA) in response to technological advances in organ
transplantation, public appeals by families in need of organ transplants
and assistance with associated expenses, and the need to prohibit the
burgeoning of a commercial market for organs." With NOTA,
Congress first sought to develop a rational, fair, coordinated, and
efficient national public/private collaborative organ procurement and
transplantation system.'7 Congress then made it "unlawful for any
person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human
organ for valuable consideration in human transplantation use if the
transfer affects interstate commerce." 8 The Congress-imposed penalty
for persons who engage in the exchange of human organs for valuable
consideration is a $50,000 maximum fine and/or a maximum five-year
imprisonment.19
16. Lauren R. Siegel, Comment, Re-Engineering the Laws of Organ
Transplantation, 49 EMORY L.J. 917, 934 (2000).
17. See S. REP. No. 98-382, at 4 (1984). To achieve this objective, Congress
created the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Registry, a private nonprofit
entity, to maintain a national registry of individuals in need of organs, match and
allocate organs based on medical criteria, develop quality standards for organ
procurement and transplantation, and assist local organ procurement organizations
in equitably distributing and transporting organs to transplant centers nationwide.
42 U.S.C. § 274a-b (2000).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000).
19. Id. ("The term 'human organ' means the human ... kidney, liver, heart,
lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof
and any other human organ ... specified by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services by regulation.").
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Under the statute, "valuable consideration" does not include
"reasonable payments associated with the removal, transportation,
implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a
human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, or lost wages incurred
by the donor in connection with the donation of the organ., 20 NOTA
was passed with little debate2' and the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources provided only a brief explanation for the
prohibition by stating that the "prohibition on the buying and selling of
human organs is directed at preventing the for-profit marketing of
kidneys and other organs" in the committee's belief that "human body
parts should not be viewed as commodities.,
22
The committee distinguished the sale of organs from the sale of
blood and blood derivatives, thus the prohibition is not intended to
include body products because they "can be replenished" and donation
"does not compromise the health of the donor."'', Ultimately, the
committee explained that "the current state of the law was uncertain
with regard to the sale of organs," and thus legislation was needed for
clarification.24
Prior to the enactment of NOTA in 1984, organ donation and
transplantation regulation traditionally had been exclusively a matter
20. Id. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources elaborated on
this provision recognizing that a person donating a kidney "may sustain expenses
from travel, housing, and lost wages, which are not appropriately and fairly
reimbursed by voluntary organizations of [sic] federal programs" and thus "it is
not the intent of the committee that any such reasonable costs be considered part
of valuable consideration." S. REP. No. 98-382, at 16 (1984). This NOTA
exemption for reimbursement for expenses incurred in relation to organ donation
and transplantation has prompted Congress and states to introduce or enact
legislation aimed at removing the financial dis-incentive of donation through tax
relief for donation related expenses. See H.R. 2474, 109th Cong. (2005) (providing
that an individual who donates a qualified life-saving organ will be allowed a tax
credit in the sum of un-reimbursed costs paid and/or any lost wages in connection
with such transplantation); Sean Arthers, Comment, No More Circumventing the
Dead: The Least-Cost Model Congress Should Adopt to Address the Abject Failure
of Our National Organ Donation Regime, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1101, 1102 (2005)
("On January 30, 2004, Wisconsin became the first state in the nation to offer
living donors a tax deduction to cover expenses associated with their organ
donation.").
21. Siegel, supra note 16, at 934.
22. S. Rep. No. 98-382, at 4, 16-17 (1984).
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 17.
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of state law.25 At the time of NOTA's passage, all fifty states and the
District of Columbia had adopted, with minor variations, the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), drafted in 1968 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to encourage
the making of anatomical gifts. 26 The UAGA set out who could make
an anatomical gift and how it could be made. 27 However, the Act
failed to mention explicitly commerce in organs,28 thus necessitating
Congress' prohibition of selling human organs in NOTA.
The UAGA was amended in 1987 explicitly to outlaw the purchase
and sale of organs, reflecting NOTA's prohibition on the sale of organs
for valuable consideration.' 9 While fewer than half of the states have
adopted the amended UAGA with the specific prohibitions on organ
sales,30 in states that have enacted the 1987 version, any currently
prohibited financial incentive for organ donation that becomes legal
due to a lifting or clarification in NOTA's prohibition may nonetheless
remain prohibited by state law.
The Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act: Congress'
Missed Opportunity
In 2004, Congress passed the Organ Donation and Recovery
Improvement Act (Organ Donation Act) to respond to the
considerable concern over the already large and growing number of
25. Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues
of a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (1989).
26. Id. at 6.
27. See Unif. Anatomical Gift Act §§ 1-3 (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 1-38
(2003) (providing that gifts could be given by any individual of sound mind and
eighteen years of age or more and also by relatives in the absence of any objection
by the deceased or relatives of greater priority; gifts could made by will, card, or
other document).
28. Siegel, supra note 16, at 933 (noting that "commentators, [nonetheless],
interpreted [UAGA] to prohibit the sale of organs").
29. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 10 (amended 1987) 8 U.L.A. 62 (2003) ("A
person may not knowingly, for valuable consideration, purchase or sell a part for
transplantation or therapy, if removal is intended to occur after the death of the
decedent.").
30. Siegel, supra note 16, at 933. As of 2000, "[o]nly twenty-one states adopted
the ... amended UAGA with the prohibition on organ sales. See also Curtis H.
Harris & Stephen P. Alcorn, To Solve a Deadly Shortage: Economic Incentives for
Human Organ Donation, 16 (3) ISSUES L. & MED. 213,222 (2001).
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individuals on the transplant waiting list." In adopting the Organ
Donation Act, Congress implemented important measures necessary
to improve the current altruism-based organ procurement and
transplantation system. However, Congress missed an opportunity to
adopt provisions that would have permitted financial incentives that
would encourage cadaveric organ donation, a potentially effective
policy-alternative response to the organ shortage.
Congress' passage of the Organ Donation Act sought to respond to
the growing problem by authorizing the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to provide several financial and educational
plans. Such plans include funding for public awareness efforts
addressing the need for organ donation, awarding grants to organ
procurement organizations and hospitals to better coordinate and
increase the rate of organ donation, and funding studies to "improve
the recovery, preservation, and transportation of organs."'2 The Organ
Donation Act also authorized HHS to award grants to states,
transplant centers, qualified organ procurement organizations or other
public or private entities for providing reimbursement of travel and
subsistence expenses incurred by individuals making a living organ
donation.33
31. Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-216, 118
Stat. 584 (2004).
32. See Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act at 585-88.
Proponents of financial incentives agree that reforms associated with the
provisions of this legislation such as "establishing a National Organ Donor
Registry, adoption of 'best practices' by Organ Procurement Organizations, raising
pay for organ procurement coordinators to reduce their turnover rate, and having
organ procurement coordinators in hospitals at all times" are changes "welcome
and beneficial, in that they promise to improve the communication of the wishes of
the deceased to the family, and to remove from the family the burden of making
the difficult decision at that most devastating time, when they have only recently
learned that their loved one is brain-dead." Joint Letter to Congress, Home Page
of AHCSIOS, The Ad Hoc Committee for Solving the Intractable Organ
Shortage, http://www.organgiving.org/proposal.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
[hereinafter Joint Letter to Congress]. Proponents object, however, that such
measures only promise to yield more organs from those who have previously
volunteered to be donors and likely would not result in an increase in the number
of volunteers.
33. Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act at 584-85. "[Q]ualifying
expenses .. . include the expenses of having relatives or other individuals .. .
accompany or assist the donating individual."
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The provisions Congress adopted in the Act reflect a preference to
improve and maintain the solely altruistic scheme of organ donation.
34
While Congress agreed to authorize grants to reimburse living donors
for expenses incurred when donating their organs (a form of
compensation clearly permissible within the NOTA framework),35
Congress failed to adopt an earlier Senate version of the Organ
Donation Act that would have authorized demonstration projects to
determine whether financial incentives would increase cadaveric
donation -- projects that would be authorized "notwithstanding" the
provisions of NOTA 6
Congress also failed to adopt a provision (labeled a "technical
amendment concerning organ purchases" in an earlier bill version)
3 7
that would have amended NOTA's prohibition on organ-for-value
exchange by clarifying that valuable consideration excludes "familial,
emotional, psychological, or physical benefit to an organ donor,
recipient, or any other party to an organ donation event."'38 The
34. The provisions also reflect a continued legislative preference to enact
measures that tend to favor living organ donation over cadaveric. See H.R. Res.
2474, 109th Cong. §25(c) (2005) (allowing a tax credit of up to $5,000 for
individuals who donate a qualified life-saving organ and incur unreimbursed costs
paid and lost wages in connection with the transplantation); Arthers, supra note
20, at 1102 (discussing Wisconsin's action offering living donors a tax deduction to
cover expenses associated with their organ donation).
35. S. Rep. No. 98-382, at 4, 16 (1984).
36. National Kidney Foundation, Organ Donation/Assistance for Living
Doctors, http://www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/newsitem.cfm?id=244 (last visited
Sept. 11, 2005). The earlier Senate version of the bill, sponsored by Sen. William
Frist, authorized the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS") to conduct
up to three demonstration projects to increase cadaveric donation
"[n]otwithstanding section 301 of the National Organ Transplant Act" ("NOTA"),
the provision prohibiting the exchange of organs for valuable consideration, S.573,
108th Cong. §378A (as introduced in Senate, March 6, 2003) (The provisions
authorizing limited demonstration projects to increase cadaveric donation were
struck from S.573 and not included in the final version passed by the Senate on
November 25, 2003). Each project would last no more than three years and would
be subject to ongoing ethical review and evaluation by the Secretary of HHS to
ensure that the projects would be "administered effectively as possible and in
accordance with the stated purpose [to increase cadaveric organ donation within
the boundaries of NOTA's prohibition]." Id.
37. S. 573, 108th Cong. § 105 (as introduced in Senate, March 6, 2003)(This
provision technically amending NOTA was struck from the S. 573 and not included
in the final version passed by the Senate on November 25, 2003).
38. Id.
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drafters of this provision may have intended to encourage living
donation by considering the benefits a living donor would receive after
donation, thus ensuring that such benefits are allowed under federal
law. However, such clarification of NOTA arguably could attain some
legal wiggle room to allow for the implementation of indirect financial
incentives in cadaveric organ donation.
Some proponents of financial incentives in cadaveric organ donation
have suggested a tightly regulated indirect incentive in the form of a
benefit of a set amount that would reward the deceased donor's estate
upon the family's decision to "give the gift of life."39 By providing such
an incentive, the decision to donate would arguably yield a "familial
benefit" because the remuneration could be used by the family "to
help pay for funeral or hospital costs, as a donation to the deceased's
favorite charity, or could simply remain with the estate." 40 A family's
decision to donate a loved-one's organs would also yield an
"emotional" or "psychological" benefit if the funds received were used
to memorialize the deceased.41
While Congress' decision to preserve the purely altruistic framework
of NOTA in the Organ Donation Act is favored by the National
Kidney Foundation,42 other influential groups such as the American
39. Joint Letter to Congress, supra note 32 (Proponents have suggested a gift of
$5,000 to the estate of the deceased upon the decision of family members to donate
gift to the estate administered by the existing organ procurement organization).
Earlier legislation introduced in the 107th Congress by Rep. James Greenwood
authorized demonstration projects implementing the use of a financial incentive to
encourage cadaveric organ donation in the form of a life insurance policy or
annuity payable to a donor's designee upon donation of the deceased's organs,
H.R. Res. 5224, 107th Cong. §1 (referred to the Subcommittee on Health, July 29,
2002).
40. Joint Letter to Congress, supra note 32.
41. See Joint Letter to Congress, supra note 32 (indicating that the gift to the
estate of the deceased would be characterized as "society's way of honoring the
sacrifice [the family] is being asked to make" and a "token of... deep and sincere
appreciation for [the family's] generosity at [a] most difficult time").
42. See National Kidney Foundation, supra note 36. A successful advocacy
effort by the National Kidney Foundation ("NKF") resulted in the removal of the
provision authorizing demonstration projects exploring the use of financial
incentives for cadaveric organ donation. Id. Although NKF did not support
financial incentives, NKF applauded Congress' steps to assist living donors with
financial burdens associated with donation, id. Research conducted by NKF's
Council of Nephrology Social Workers indicates that 25 percent of potential
donors are hesitant to donate due to concerns with the potential financial burden
incurred by the living donor. Id. The NKF has taken a strong position against
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Medical Association, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS),"
American Nephrology Nurses' Association (ANNA), 45 and American
Society of Transplant Surgeons (ASTS),46 have come out in support of
financial incentives as the Board of Directors voted unanimously in 2002 to oppose
any policy that would support financial incentives for organ donation. Sanford &
Rocchiccioli, supra note 8 at 279. According to the NKF chairman, Andrew N.
Baur, "[tihere is no way to [provide a financial incentive] and maintain our values
as a society . . . [t]he voluntary system we have, free of coercion or
commercialization, is the only ethical way medicine can be practiced in the United
States." National Kidney Foundation, supra note 36. Also taking a strong
position, Ellen Gottman-Kulik, chair of NKF's Donor Family Council,
commented, "fm]oney is an insult to donor families ... [a] son or daughter's heart
should not be 'worth' $300 ... [t]he Gift of Life is a gift and no person's organs
should be made into a commodity." Id at 1.
43. Bruce Japsen, AMA: Study Paying for Organ Donation, CHICAGO TRIB.,
June 19, 2002, at Business, 1 (in 2002, the American Medical Association's House
of Delegates came out in favor of studies to determine whether money should be
used to motivate potential donors and their families). See also Assessing
Initiatives to Increase Organ Donations: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations of the H.Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th
Cong. 108-36 (June 3, 2003) [hereinafter Assessing Initiatives] (statement of Robert
M. Sade, M.D., Member of the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs)
("[the AMA has] noted that financial incentives might be an important
motivational factor in the context of cadaveric organ donation but that it remains
inadequately explored because of federal prohibition."); Sanford & Rocchiccioli,
supra note 8, at 279 (although unwilling to endorse financial incentives, the AMA
is in favor of studies on incentives that have "clearly measurable outcomes, defined
timeframes, use incentives of moderate value, and meet all ethical and scientific
design requirements.").
44. Assessing Initiatives, supra note 43 (statement of Robert Metzger, M.D.,
President-Elect, United Network for Organ Sharing) ("UNOS ... endorsed the
proposal to look at studies and support the study of financial incentives to see if
there would be any benefit in the organ donation process with financial
incentives.").
45. See Sanford & Rocchiccioli, supra note 8, at 279 (taking the position that
"research regarding financial incentives for organ donation will give valuable
insight into whether these recommendations increase donor supply or deter
altruistic donors.").
46. Carey Goldberg, Fiscal Incentive Weighed to boost U.S. Organ Supply, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 8, 2003, at Al. See also Nicholas D. Kristof, Psst! Sell Your
Kidney?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2002, at A27; Assessing Initiatives, supra note 43
(statement of Abraham Shaked, M.D., President of the ASTS) (indicating that the
ASTS clearly opposes payment for organs, however, does not oppose efforts to
study methods and programs to increase donation rates "that may have a financial
component"). Dr. Shaked specifically indicated that ASTS supported the initially
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pilot programs to explore the use of financial incentives in cadaveric
organ donation. The ASTS particularly favors a Pennsylvania
initiative to reimburse families for funeral expenses as an incentive for
consenting to their loved-one's organ donation.47 Unfortunately, this
initiative has never been implemented due to NOTA's perceived
prohibition on financial incentives concerning cadaveric organ
donation. This perception remains due to Congress' missed
opportunity to clarify NOTA when enacting the Organ Donation Act.
Pennsylvania's Innovative but Federally Inhibited Response to the
Shortage of Organ Donors
In 1994, the State of Pennsylvania sought to respond to the organ-
shortage by passing legislation creating an Organ Donor Awareness
Trust Fund from which family members of deceased donors would be
reimbursed for funeral expenses to encourage cadaveric organ
donation. 4' However, in 2002, the Pennsylvania Department of Health
concluded that the funeral benefit "strayed too close" to violating
federal law, specifically NOTA's provision prohibiting offering
valuable consideration in exchange for organs.49 Because of this, the
Department scrapped the funeral benefit, and instead, implemented a
$300 stipend per organ donor for food and lodging costs incurred by
the donor or the donor's family. 0 Organ procurement organization
representatives and the bill's original sponsor disagree with the
decision to change the funeral benefit to a food and lodging stipend.
introduced version of Senator Frist's bill, S. 573, allowing for financial incentive
demonstration projects. Id.
47. Francis L. Delmonico et al., Ethical Incentives-Not Payment-For Organ
Donation, 346 (25) NEW ENG. J. MED. 2002, 2004 (2002). The majority of members
of an ethics panel for the American Society of Transplant Surgeons support
Pennsylvania's proposed program to provide partial reimbursement for funeral
expenses. Id. ASTS would support a demonstration project that "assessed the
effectiveness of providing a modest funeral expense benefit to the donor, not as a
payment for a donated organ, but as a token of thanks." Assessing Initiatives,
supra note 43 (statement of Abraham Shaked, M.D., President, ASTS).
48. 20 PA. CONST. STAT. § 8622 (2001); See also Arnold et al., supra note 11, at
1366 (noting that the fund was subsequently renamed the Robert P. Casey
Memorial Fund in honor of the Pennsylvania Governor who was a multiple organ
transplant recipient).
49. Sanford & Rocchiccioli, supra note 8, at 278; Christopher Snowbeck,
Organ Donor Funeral Aid Scrapped: Health Department Fears Conflict with
Federal Law, PITYSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Feb. 1, 2002, at 31.
50. Snowbeck, supra note 49, at 31.
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These dissenters contend that this change does little to assist cadaveric
donor families." However, Pennsylvania Department of Health
officials have defended the decision, explaining that, "covering the
costs of food and lodging was not as risky because [NOTA] specifically
allows for such reimbursements.,
52
The original Pennsylvania act, adopted in 1994, established a trust
fund into which people could contribute when applying for a driver's
license or when filing a state income tax return 3 The act provided
that ten percent of the total fund could be expended annually by the
Pennsylvania Department of Health for "reasonable hospital and other
medical expenses, funeral expenses, and incidental expenses incurred
by the donor or by the donor's family in connection with making a vital
organ donation. 5 4 The Pennsylvania Department of Health could
spend up to $3,000 per donor, but payments could only be made
directly to the funeral home, hospital, or other service provider related
51. Id. While the program may be helpful for living donors, organ recovery
experts suggest that the food and lodging benefit will do little to help brain-dead
relatives as they usually do not go to restaurants or hotels right after making the
decision to donate their loved-one's organs, id. See also Ovetta Wiggins, Pa.
Organ Donors Get $300 Boost, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 27, 2002, at Al (reporting
that an organ procurement expert contends that the food and lodging benefit will
not achieve what the funeral benefit's advocates wanted to achieve, as the original
$3,000 benefit was substantial and seen as a possible way to increase the number of
organs from deceased donors). Rep. Bill Robinson, the sponsor of the original
legislation, regards the bill as watered-down and a far cry from what was intended,
a benefit that helps families with a major concern after death. Id.
52. Snowbeck, supra note 49, at B1. As noted earlier, under NOTA, "valuable
consideration" does not include "reasonable payments associated with the
removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control,
and storage of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, or lost wages
incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with the donation of the
organ," 42 U.S.C. § 274e.
53. Wiggins, supra note 49, at Al. In addition to creating the trust fund, the
Pennsylvania act mandated public education programs to increase awareness of
the organ shortage, required hospitals to notify organ procurement agencies of
every death, and authorized the Governor to create a fifteen-member advisory
panel to make recommendations about how the trust fund money should be spent,
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Pennsylvania Set to Break Taboo on Reward for Organ
Donation, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1999, at Al.
54. 20 PA. CONST. STAT. § 8622 (2001); Margaret M. Byrne & Peter Thompson,
A Positive Analysis of Financial Incentives for Cadaveric Organ Donation, 20 J.
HEALTH ECON. 69, 70 (2001) (as of January 1999, the trust had accumulated
$300,000).
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to the donation, ensuring that no part of the fund would ever "be
transferred directly to the donor's family, next of kin or estate.,
55
Pennsylvania's proposed funeral benefit trust fund system has
received significant support in the organ transplantation community,
particularly from the ASTS. The ASTS support is important because it
represents a consensus among proponents of altruism 56 and proponentsof diect •57
of direct compensation, two camps with compelling yet irreconcilable
positions on how to solve the organ shortage problem. The ASTS
chose to support a funeral benefit system after assembling a panel of
ethicists, organ procurement organization executives, physicians, and
55. 20 PA. CONST. STAT. § 8622 (2001). The Pennsylvania plan was intended to
be "a voluntary death benefit for a family who gave a gift" and not the buying and
selling of organs, according to Howard Nathan, a member of the advisory
committee recommending the plan, Donald Joralemon, Shifting Ethics: Debating
the Incentive Question in Organ Transplantation, 27 J. MED. ETHIcS 30, 31 (2001).
56. Proponents of altruism believe that organs should be given and not paid
for in the belief that payment degrades fundamental values of life and liberty and
fosters class distinctions and exploitation. Delmonico et al., supra note 45, at 2004
("These values are degraded when a poor person feels compelled to risk death for
the sole purpose of obtaining monetary payment for a body part."). Payment for
organs is also objected to on religious grounds as a violation of the dignity of the
human person, captured in the following statement by Pope John Paul II:
[Donating an organ] is not just a matter of giving away something that
belongs to us but of giving something of ourselves, for by virtue of its
substantial union with a spiritual soul, the human body cannot be
considered as a mere complex of tissues, organs and functions ... rather it
is a constitutive part of the person who manifests and expresses himself
through it. Accordingly, any procedure which tends to commercialize
human organs or to consider them as items of exchange or trade must be
considered morally unacceptable, because to use the body as an 'object' is
to violate the dignity of the human person.
Arnold et al., supra note 11, at 1362-63. Proponents of altruism also fear
undesirable consequences from organ sales such as donors withholding medical
information that results in the transmission of disease and families induced to
prematurely withdraw care of loved-ones if death is linked to the sale of organs, id.
at 1362.
57. Proponents of compensation take the ethical position that the objective of
saving patients' lives should trump the natural desire to impose personal moral or
philosophical attitudes on others, Andrew H. Barnett et al., Improving Organ
Donation: Compensation Versus Markets, 29 INQUIRY 372, 372 (1992). Thus, if
compensation will better achieve the objective of saving lives, it should be
permitted, id. at 373. Libertarian proponents of payment hold that "autonomy
rights of individuals are paramount, and that those rights encompass the ability to
sell one's body or organs," Arnold et al., supra note 11 at 1363.
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surgeons, considering forms of financial incentives. Panel members
found funeral benefits to be the best mechanism for increasing the
supply of organs while maintaining the ethical preference for
preserving the gift concept in organ donation." A funeral benefit was
viewed as a suitable alternative within the current altruistic structure of
donation because it preserved an essential ethical perception of
gratitude in organ exchange. 6° Panel members preferred a funeral
benefit over other financial incentive forms, such as direct payment or
an income tax credit, because such forms were more likely to be
perceived as a "purchase of a commodity," rather than as a "thank
61you" on behalf of society.
58. Arnold et al., supra note 11, at 1361; Assessing Initiatives, supra note 43
(statement of Abraham Shaked, M.D., President of the ASTS) ("ASTS would
support a demonstration project that assessed the effectiveness of providing a
modest funeral expense benefit to the family of a decedent donor, not as a
payment for a donated organ, but as a token of thanks.").
59. Arnold et al., supra note 11 at 1365. The panel members supported the
ethical propriety of a funeral benefit as it best balances the two goals of holding to
a purely altruistic system in a capitalistic system and the potential for a more
effective method of procuring organs. Id. Panel members believed that a benefit
in the range of $600 - 3,500 would be an acceptable "limited" reimbursement
amount given that the cost of a funeral in this country is likely to be at least several
thousand dollars. Id. at 1366. The group also approved of the use of a
contribution to a charitable organization at the direction of the family as ethically
acceptable as long as the amount was not large as to become an excessive
inducement. Id. at 1364. The panel members decided that a charitable
contribution in the range of $500 - 1500 would an acceptable amount. Id. at 1366.
60. Id. at 1364, 1367. Direct payment and an income tax credit were
disfavored as they would not fulfill the ethical principles of "preserv[ing] the
concept of a gift, convey[ing] gratitude for the gift, avoid[ing] commodifying
organs, honor[ing] the deceased, not alter[ing] the care of the donor, or
maintain[ing] the public trust in the integrity of the organ supply," id. at 1364. The
panel acknowledged, however, that its advocacy for a funeral benefit may be
perceived as a "laundered form of compensation [or] [a]t best, it could appear to
be inconsistent," given its unanimous support for the concept of altruism and its
opposition to a direct payment. Id. at 1365. See also Edward W. Nelson et al.,
Financial Incentives for Organ Donation: A Report of the Payment Subcommittee,
United Network for Organ Sharing Ethics Committee (June 30, 1993), http://www.
unos.org/Resources/bioethics.asp?index=3 [hereinafter UNOS Report] (noting that
proponents of financial incentives have characterized the concept as "rewarded
gifting," but opponents criticize this term as an oxymoron and a "despicable
euphemism").
61. Arnold et al., supra note 11, at 1364 (Figure 1).
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Pennsylvania's legislative initiative and the ASTS panel's support for
a funeral benefit incentive system should be a signal to national policy
makers that there is considerable support in the organ transplantation
community and among the public for exploring alternatives to the
current solely altruistic approach to organ donation. The funeral
benefit incentive is the result of a successful public deliberation where
•• 62
proponents of opposite positions have come to an agreement on ways
to address the organ shortage." It is essential that Congress seize the
moment by funding demonstration projects to test the use of funeral
benefits and act to clearly define NOTA's prohibition on exchanging
organs for valuable consideration, so that states, like Pennsylvania, can
respond to the needs of those waiting for a life-saving organ.
A Funeral Benefit to Donor Families is a Workable Compliment to
Pure Altruism as it Serves Important Interests Within the Framework of
NOTA
An incentive in the form of funeral benefits to deceased donor
family members is a reasonable policy innovation within the
framework of NOTA that augments pure altruism and addresses the
shortage of cadaveric organs. A funeral benefit serves important
interests within the framework of NOTA: first, it serves the family's
interest in possessing and controlling the body for final disposition;
second, it serves the state's interest in having an effective life-saving
62. For a statement of support by an altruism proponent, see Delmonico et al.,
supra note 47, at 2003 ("Reimbursement for funeral expenses [is different than a
tax credit because it] is intended as an expression of society's appreciation for the
donation, and it is consistent with the provision for reimbursement of the expenses
of donation after the declaration of death."); For a statement of support by
proponents of compensation, see Joint Letter to Congress, supra note 32 ("We
believe we have a compromise plan that both comports with human dignity and
constitutes the tiniest imaginable step toward utilizing the power of financial
incentives to bring the supply of cadaveric organs up to meet the demand.").
63. Ethicists and philosophers, such as John Rawls, could reasonably recognize
the consensus on the funeral benefit as an excellent example of "public reason," in
which citizens of a "well-ordered society" with different (and ultimately
irreconcilable) philosophical views and moral and religious beliefs find a set of
values and principles that each can publicly endorse. Cynthia B. Cohen, Promises
and Perils of Public Deliberation: Contrasting Two National Bioethics
Commissions on Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 15(3) KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J.
269, 274-75 (2005). Proponents of altruism and compensation came together to
fashion a policy of shared values by preserving the concept of gift while endorsing
the use of a financial incentive that will effectively increase organ supply, saving
lives. Id.
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organ allocation system; third, it does not involve a commerce in living
donor organs; and fourth, it is not exploitative and serves the interests
of minority communities.
The Family's Interest in the Body
A funeral benefit incentive is an excellent policy alternative since it
serves an overlooked interest: family members' common law-
recognized control over the body of their deceased.64 Although courts
have differed somewhat in how they characterize this interest, with
some regarding it as a "property" right, and others regarding it as a
right, the essence of the interest is the same under"quasi-property" i  65  c  eeti esm e
both views: a limited interest to possess and control the body in order
to fulfill the duty of decent disposition.
Courts have defined the boundaries of the family's interest in the
body of their deceased in a series of cases involving a coroner's
removal of body parts without consent of family members. 66  In
Brotherton v. Cleveland,67 the court held that a wife had a recognized
property interest in her deceased husband's corneas that rose to the
level of a "legitimate claim of entitlement," protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 68 The court recognized
64. Eric S. Jaffe, "She's Got Bette Davis[s'] Eyes": Assessing the
Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process
Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528, 543 (1990) ("The right is typically characterized
as one for possession of the cadaver, in undisturbed condition, and gives rise to
actions such as wrongful autopsy and wrongful possession of the body."); Siegel,
supra note 16, at 927-28 ("Courts generally recognize a quasi-property right in the
relatives of the decedent.").
65. Samantha A. Wilcox, Comment, Presumed Consent Organ Donation in
Pennsylvania: One Small Step for Pennsylvania, One Giant Leap for Organ
Donation, 107 DICK. L. REV. 935, 947.
66. Cases have frequently involved the removal of corneal tissue by coroners
or medical examiners pursuant to state statutes authorizing removal for
transplantation.
67. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
68. Id. at 480 (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1,
9, (1978)). See Melissa A.W. Stickney, Property Interests in Cadaverous Organs:
Changes to Ohio Anatomical Gift Law and the Erosion of Family Rights, 17 J. L. &
HEALTH 37, 56 (2004) (providing and in-depth analysis of Brotherton). Because
the plaintiff's interest rose to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement and the
removal of the deceased's corneas was under the authority of established state
procedures, the wife was entitled to a necessary deprivation process. Brotherton,
923 F.2d at 482. See also Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir.
1995) (following Brotherton in the view that the next of kin have a constitutionally
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this interest in the body as "substantial," even though extremely
regulated.69
This property interest in the body of the deceased was further
explained in a factually similar 2002 federal opinion, Newman v.
Sathyavasglswaran.0 In Newman, the court held that parents had
"exclusive and legitimate claims of entitlement to possess, control,
dispose and prevent the violation ... of the bodies of their deceased
children., 71 The court explained that this right of the family over the
deceased's body is "deeply rooted in our legal history and social
traditions," and serves a "duty to protect the dignity of the human
body in its final disposition. ,72
Other courts have viewed the interest as less substantial,
characterizing it as a "quasi-property" right rather than a property
right. In Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant,73 the court finds a more
limited view than the common law concept of "quasi property in
recognition of the interests of surviving relatives in the possession and
control of decedents' bodies" is not of constitutional dimension.74
protected property interest in the dead body of a relative); Mansaw v. Midwest
Organ Bank and Truman Med. Ctr. W., No. 97-0271-CV-W-6, 1998 WL 386327, at
8 (W.D.Mo. July 8, 1998).
69. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482. The court noted that "[t]he prevailing view of
both English and American courts eventually became that next of kin have a
'quasi-property' right in decedent's body for purposes of burial or other lawful
disposition" (citing Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 186 A. 585, 586 (1936)).
70. Newman v. Sathyavaglswarn, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002) (parents whose
deceased children's corneas were removed by a county coroner's office without
notice or consent were permitted to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as the county's
deprivation of the corneas constituted a deprivation of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
71. Id. at 796.
72. Id.
73. Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985) (the
mother of a deceased infant brought suit claiming wrongful removal of corneal
tissue following death pursuant to statute).
74. Id. at 128-129 (holding that there was no violation of due process as the
state's General Assembly had "within its power, in the interest of public welfare,
to authorize this procedure, which yearly benefits hundreds of Georgians."). See
also Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 527 S.E.2d 240, 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)
("The quasi-property right in a corpse is not pecuniary in nature, nor should it be.
The right encompasses only the power to ensure that the corpse is orderly handled
and laid to rest, nothing more."); Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network,
Inc., 356 F.Supp.2d 237, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("the narrow rights in a deceased's
body are reserved exclusively for the next of kin and only for purposes of ensuring
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Although Lavant held a more limited view of this right than did
Brotherton and Newman, the Lavant court, nonetheless, acknowledged
that a common law interest existed in the next of kin over the body of
the deceased 5
This "quasi-property" limited view of the rights of family members
over the body of the deceased was also found in State v. Powell,
76
where the court held that no constitutional due process violation
occurred when a medical examiner removed corneas without parental
authorization, as permitted by statute.7 7 However, what is significant is
that the court in a later decision rejected Powell's broad language
recognizing no constitutionally protected property interest, and
instead, embraced Brotherton's view that next of kin have a "legitimate
claim of entitlement . . . to possession of the remains of a decedent for
burial or other lawful disposition" and that this interest is entitled to
constitutional protection.7 8 The Crocker court also suggested that the
right of next of kin to possess the decedent's remains for disposition is
proper disposition of the deceased's body. Courts have consistently stated that it is
against public policy to recognize broad property rights in the body of a
deceased."); Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp. and Med. Ctr., Inc., 886 F.Supp. 1551,
1563 (D. Kan. 1995) ("Kansas common law on this matter is no different from the
position universally held by other states which recognizes no property right,
commercial or material, in the corpse itself but only a right of possession in order
to dispose of the corpse appropriately.").
75. Georgia Lions Eye Bank, 335 S.E.2d at 128. In considering the nature of
the family's right to the body, the court referenced a rather skeptical view on the
"quasi-property right" by W.L. Prosser, "It seems reasonably obvious that such
'property' is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that in
reality the personal feelings of the survivors are being protected, under a fiction to
deceive no one but a lawyer." Id. However, the court then noted that while there
is no recognized property right in a dead body at common law, the courts of
"civilized and Christian countries regard respect for the dead as not only a virtue
but a duty, and hold that.., a quasi property right belongs to the husband or wife,
and, if neither, to the next of kin." Id.
76. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986).
77. Id. at 1191 (commenting that "[a]ll authorities generally agree that the next
of kin have no property right in the remains of a decedent.").
78. Crocker v. Pleasant, 778 So. 2d 978, 988 (Fla. 2001). The court in Crocker
explained that Powell merely held that a Florida statute pertaining to corneal
tissue removal was constitutional after finding that the state's interest in obtaining
suitable corneal tissue far outweighed the "infinitesimally small intrusion" incident
to corneal removal. Id. at 985. The state's intrusion in Crocker was significantly
greater as a city and county buried the twenty-three year old son of the plaintiffs
after making virtually no effort to notify them of his death. Id. at 980. The parents
only came to know of their son's burial after filing a missing person's report. Id.
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based on a need to "celebrate the life of the deceased 'through
appropriate commemoration."'7 9
Brotherton, Newman, and Crocker reveal that courts have been
inclined to view family members' interests in the bodies of their
deceased as substantial and of constitutional dimension. Even courts
that recognize this interest as one of "quasi property," and thus not
rising to the level of constitutional protection, nonetheless recognize
that interests to possess and control remains exist under the common
law. As Newman and Crocker suggest, the purpose of this interest is to
enable family members to fulfill their societal duties to protect the
body's dignity in its final disposition and to celebrate the life of the
deceased through appropriate commemoration.8
A financial incentive in the form of a funeral benefit serves the
important court-recognized societal interest family members have over
their deceased's bodies. By allowing family members to voluntarily
accept assistance with funeral expenses, next-of-kin are enabled to
exercise their rights and fulfill their duties to memorialize and provide
a decent disposition of their deceased. Conversely, the federal law, by
prohibiting family members from receiving assistance for funeral
expenses, next-of-kin are hindered in exercising and performing legally
protected rights and duties.
The State Interest of Major Significance: An Increase in Organ
Donation
In addition to serving family members' interests in their deceased's
bodies, a funeral benefit incentive serves an important state interest in
supporting an effective and life-saving organ procurement and
transplantation process. When NOTA was enacted in 1984, Congress
79. Id. at 985.
80. Newman v. Sathyavaglswarn, 287 F.3d 786, 796 (9th Cir. 2002); Crocker,
778 So. 2d at 985.
81. In addition to saving lives due to increased donation, proponents of
financial incentives for organ donation point out that paying for organs would be
cost-effective. UNOS Report, supra note 60 ("[I]f 500 additional donors and
therefore 1,000 additional cadaveric kidneys were gained [from the use of a
financial incentive scheme], the potential savings to the medical care system would
be over $30 million, many times the initial incentive outlay."); Kristoff, supra note
46, at A27 (noting that "paying for organs would be cost-effective, because dialysis
costs much more than a transplant operation itself"). According to scholars who
have researched the cost of dialysis in comparison to transplantation, a successful
kidney transplantation saves as much as $60,000 per end-stage renal disease
patient over a five-year period. DAVID L. KASERMAN & A. H. BARNETr, THE U.S.
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believed it necessary for the federal government to act to "encourage
organ donation and improve procedures for efficient organ
procurement leading to successful transplantation., 82 A funeral benefit
incentive furthers this important state interest by encouraging organ
donation from individuals who are not inclined to donate within the
current framework of pure altruism.83 Since NOTA's enactment, the
insistence on pure altruism as the exclusive means through which
organs can be procured has been insufficient in meeting the need for
organ donors.8
Courts have recognized the states' interests in implementing policy
that encourages organ donation. In Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank,85
the court rejected a challenge to a pro-organ transplant statute as the
state had a "legitimate and compelling interest in providing for and
ORGAN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM 34-35 (Marvin H. Kosters, ed., The AEI Press
2002). The Health Care Financing Administration, the federal underwriter for
dialysis under Medicare, could gain substantial savings if all suitable renal patients
on the waitlist received transplants. Id.
82. S. Rep. No. 98-382, at 4 (1984).
83. See Thomas G. Peters, Life or Death: The Issue of Payment in Cadaveric
Organ Donation, 265 (10) J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 1302, 1302-3 (1991). Altruism as the
sole reason for cadavaric organ recovery is a belief that persists in the medical
community possibly based on "the incorrect assumption that altruism emerges
with counseling and education, that altruistic behavior should prevail in this
matter, and that persons unwilling to exhibit altruistic behavior should not be
coerced into any other behavior as this coercion would impinge on free personal
decision making." Id at 1301. Peters suggests, instead, that some population
groups harbor different thoughts and feelings about organ donation and do not
operate under the same established social mores as the medical community does,
which hold altruism as the only motivation for organ donation. Id. But see Amitai
Etzioni, Organ Donation, A Communitarian Approach, 13(1) KENNEDY INST. OF
ETHICS J. 1, 6 (2003) (conceding that altruism is often an insufficient motive for
action, but instead, arguing that moral persuasion is a better way to encourage
organ donation than monetary incentives). Under Etzioni's view, it is better to
make organ donation "a part of one's sense of moral obligation, something one
cannot look in the mirror or face friends without having lived up to." Id.
84. Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End
America's Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 83 (2004). While a study
has shown that "81% of Americans support the concept of voluntary organ
donation ... only about one-quarter have actually signed up as registered donors"
and many families refuse to give consent to organ donation. Id.
85. Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank & Truman Medical Center West, No. 97-
0271-CV-W-6, 1998 WL 386327, at *7 (W.D.Mo. July 8, 1998) (upholding a
Missouri statute that required the consent of only one parent to donate a deceased
child's organs).
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securing a future for the living. 8 6 The court noted that the state's
purpose in addressing the organ shortage "is of major significance not
only to those currently on waiting lists, but to all persons who may at
any time find themselves or a close family member in desperate need
of an organ." 87
In upholding the pro-organ donation statute in Mansaw, the court
justified limiting the rights of a parent over the body of a deceased
child, because the statute expressed a societal belief that "all that can
be done should be done to help the living. 88 The court was in the
position of having to weigh the conflicting interest of family members
in the body of their deceased with the state's significant interest in
increasing the supply of transplantable organs. In contrast, a funeral
benefit incentive furthers the significant state interest of encouraging
organ donation and simultaneously allows family members to exercise
their rights and societal responsibility to possess and control the body
for commemoration and decent disposition. Thus, a funeral benefit
incentive achieves the goals of securing a future for the living while
honoring the life of the deceased.
A Funeral Benefit does not Involve a Commerce in Living
Donor Organs Congress Sought to Prevent
When Congress enacted NOTA, making it "unlawful for any person
to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ
for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation,"'8 9
Congress sought to prohibit a commerce in living donor organs that
differs significantly from an indirect incentive like funeral benefits that
86. Id. at 8 (holding that a parent's property interest in his son's body "may
reasonably be disregarded, at least when the other joint property owner has
consented and Plaintiff's interest must yield to the greater rights of the State-and
our society-in carrying out its public policy.").
87. Id. at 7. See also State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986) (holding that
the societal needs for corneal tissue outweigh individual concerns in view of a pro-
organ donation statute that has undisputedly increased the supply and quality of
tissue available for transplantation); Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 335
S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ga. 1985) (concluding that the Georgia General Assembly
certainly has within its power, in the interest of the public welfare, to authorize the
removal of corneas without consent under certain conditions as the procedure
yearly benefits hundreds of Georgians).
88. Mansaw, 1998 WL 386327, at *7.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (2000).
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encourage cadaveric organ donation." Congress intended to prevent
the development of a market in living donor organs where organs
would be treated as commodities and articles for trade. Congress
believed it undesirable to permit the buying and selling of organs in
which brokers, procuring and allocating organs through an auction,
could profit from the exchange. 9 The NOTA drafters were essentially
advocating that it is unethical to treat living donor organs as a fungible
good,9 inequitable to distribute organs based on ability to pay, 93 and
90. John A. Sten, Comment, Rethinking the National Organ Transplant
Program: When Push Comes to Shove, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 197,
216 (1994) ("[I]t is indisputable that Congress intended to prevent the
commercialization of the human body. But there is no evidence that Congress
meant to prohibit all organ procurement procedures that employ financial
incentives yet operate in a non-market environment.").
91. The concerns about organ commerce are reflected in the Senate report
accompanying NOTA, stating that "the prohibition on the buying and selling of
human organs is directed at preventing the for-profit marketing of kidneys and
other organs." S. REP. No. 98-382, at 4 (1984). The report later adds, "[it is the
sense of the committee that individuals or organizations should not profit by the
sale of human organs for transplantation." Id. at 16.
92. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. In treating living donor organs as
a fungible good, ethicists argue that the dignity of human beings is not respected
because donors are reduced to parts and assigned a price, inappropriately equating
parts of living persons with other non-human goods. STEPHEN WILKINSON, BODIES
FOR SALE: ETHICS AND EXPLOITATION IN THE HUMAN BODY TRADE 45 (2003).
Ethicists ascribing to this view see no difference between treating parts of the body
as objects of commerce and treating human beings as such because "personal
identities are intimately and inextricably connected to our bodies." Carson
Holloway, Monetary Incentives for Organ Donation: Practical and Ethical
Concerns, in ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY
ISSUES 143, 152 (Bethany Spielman ed., 1996). But see infra note 100 (discussing
scholars who challenge this position).
93. See infra note 99 and accompanying text; Shelby E. Robinson, Comment,
Organs for Sale? An Analysis of Proposed Systems for Compensating Organ
Providers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV 1019, 1046 (1999) (contending that "many people
could easily be priced out of obtaining a life-saving kidney" under a market-driven
arrangement in live organs); Calandrillo, supra note 84, at 93 ("[B]anning human
organ sales could be justified on distributive justice grounds: the law would prevent
poor people from becoming the only 'sellers,' and it would provide both poor and
wealthy individuals equal access to those organs being supplied - regardless of
their ability to pay.").
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risky to permit organ brokerage because it could compromise the
health of donors and recipients.94
Congress was primarily acting in reaction to an idea of a Virginia
physician, Dr. Barry Jacobs, who planned to form the International
Kidney Exchange Ltd., where kidneys would be procured from
indigent third-world residents, organ providers would set a price for
their kidneys, and Jacobs would collect $2,000 to $5,000 from the buyer
for the brokerage services9 In response to Jacob's plan and a similar
effort by another company in New England, then-Rep. Albert Gore,
Jr. sponsored NOTA's prohibition on the exchange of organs for
valuable consideration.96  Legislative history suggests that Gore's
primary concerns behind NOTA's prohibition were that a market for
human organs would result in an unethical commodification of the
94. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. It is argued that a market for
human organs from living donors presents the risk that sellers pressured by
poverty will underestimate the risks involved in organ sales. Calandrillo, supra
note 84, at 95. Once a sale occurs, the donor incurs irreversible risk that his
remaining kidney could fail. Id. at 96. A donor may also experience a
deterioration in health following an organ donation. Id. at 95. Because of this
concern, the state has an interest in protecting the mental and physical health of
potential sellers against risks unappreciated by donors. Id. Research on the
kidney trade in India confirms some of these fears. In a survey of 305 Indians who
sold a kidney, nearly all sold to pay debts. Madhav Goyal et al., Economic and
Health Consequences of Selling a Kidney in India, 288 J. AM. MED. ASs'N 1589,
1590 (2002). In addition, the study revealed that nephrectomy was associated with
a decline in health status and half of individuals surveyed complained of persistent
pain at the nephrectomy site. Id. at 1591-92. When asked what advice they would
give to individuals with the same reasons they had for selling, seventy-nine percent
of the respondents indicated that they would not recommend selling a kidney. Id.
However, one should note that the concerns pertaining to a market for living
donor organs do not apply when considering a financial incentive for cadaveric
organ donation, as the individual does not become eligible for donation until death
has occurred, see infra note 106 and accompanying text.
95. Robinson, supra note 93, at 1036. Jacobs sent letters to 7,500 hospitals
about his plan and received responses from several indicating an interest in
removing kidneys from healthy donors Jacobs planned to solicit. Margaret Engel,
Va. Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys, WASH. POST, Sept.
19, 1983, at A9. According to Jacobs, "preliminary research showed that potential
donors set a price of up to $10,000 for one of their kidneys." Id. Jacobs planned to
overcome the illiteracy of potential donors by obtaining informed consent via
videotape, Harris & Alcorn, supra note 30, at 231. See also Walter Sullivan,
Buying of Kidneys of Poor Attacked, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1983, at A19.
96. Sullivan, supra note 95, at A19. See also Joralemon, supra note 55, at 30.
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human body,97 would compromise the health of the donor,98 and exploit
the poor.99
The comments in the report accompanying NOTA, as well as the
context in which it was passed, and the views of its chief sponsor all
suggest that Congress was seeking to prohibit a profit-motivated
commerce in living donor organs, where a brokered organ sale could
compromise the health of the donor. °° However, a funeral benefit
97. National Organ Transplant Act. Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong. 128 (1983) [hereinafter NOTA Hearings] ("It is against our
system of values to buy and sell parts of human beings. It is against our system of
values to auction off life to the highest bidder.").
98. Id. at 129. In distinguishing the buying and selling of organs from the
buying and selling of blood, Gore commented,
Blood is unusual, and once given, it is still retained. The individual who
donates blood suffers no harm. A doctor who takes blood from someone
isn't violating the Hippocratic oath by doing harm. The Hippocratic oath
says, first, do no harm. A doctor who carves into a healthy person to take
a kidney simply for money is violating the Hippocratic oath.
Id. This concern over the health of the donor is also reflected in language of the
Senate report accompanying NOTA, the prohibition on profiting off of organ
donation "is not meant to include blood and blood derivatives, which can be
replenished and whose donation does not compromise the health of the donor." S.
Rep. No. 98-382, at 16-1.7 (1984).
99. NOTA Hearings, supra note 97, at 126. Gore explained:
There is no need to risk the problems a for-profit organ procurement
system conjures up... [t]hese proposals have only served to exploit the
desperation of Americans who are pressed by the serious economic
troubles our nation is experiencing. Selling a part of their body is not the
answer to their problems and it is not the answer for those awaiting
transplants.
Id.
100. It is important to note that scholars question the assumption that it is
unethical to address the shortage of available organs for transplantation through
an organ market. Lloyd Cohen challenges the assumption that a market in human
organs is offensive to human dignity with the following question, "Which is more
offensive to human dignity: the use of market forces to increase the supply of life-
extending vital organs or criminally punishing the use of the market to harness
self-interest in the cause of saving the lives of thousands of people who are dying
for want of organs?" Lloyd R. Cohen, Directions for the Disposition of My (and
Your) Vital Organs, 28 REGULATION 32, 38 (2005) [hereinafter Cohen,
Directions]. Cohen suggests that a market in vital organs represents a reasonable
balancing of human needs. Id. at 37. Favoring a market solution to the shortage of
organs for transplantation, he has suggested an options or futures market, where
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incentive to encourage cadaveric organ donation does not implicate
the living donor organ commerce concerns underlying NOTA's
prohibition on organ exchange.
A funeral benefit to cadaveric donor families does not involve a
transaction where individuals or organizations profit from the sale of
living donor organs for transplantation. The Pennsylvania program
was purposely designed to provide only a limited amount of money,
paid out of a state established trust fund.01 Any expenditure from the
trust fund could only be made to the funeral home and never directly
to the donor's family, next of kin or estate.1' 2  The undesirable
impropriety of payment associated with organ brokerage were
basically eliminated due to the standard payment amount allocated
through the controlled organ acquisition process, implemented by the
organ procurement organization. '°3 Under the Pennsylvania approach,
no auctioning of cadaveric organs to the highest bidder could occur, a
chief concern in NOTA.'04
healthy individuals would have the opportunity to give an option on organs
recovered at their death. Id. at 32. Individuals who die under appropriate
conditions and have their organs recovered would be paid a previously determined
sum to their estate or designee. Id. See also Cohen, supra note 25, at 32-36; Harris
& Alcorn, supra note 30, at 232-33 (proposing a posthumous organ market
regulated by the Food and Drug Administration where relatives would be
permitted to sell the organs of decedents through private licensed brokers when
the decedent has provided prior consent). Because policy makers are unlikely to
implement a market in organs, Cohen has become a proponent of Lifesharers, a
nonprofit organization functioning within the framework of NOTA, where
members who indicate a willingness to donate their organs upon death through
Lifesharers are given preference to an available organ of another member if ever
in need of one. See Cohen, Directions, supra note 100, at 33; Hurley, supra note 1,
at 135; Lifesharers, Lifesharers: Organs for Organ Donors,
http://www.lifesharers.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2006). As of January 2006, 3,714
individuals had become members of Lifesharers and 23 were on a waiting list to
receive an organ. Lifesharers, FAQ, http://www.lifesharers.comlfaq.asp (last
visited Jan. 19, 2006). No member of Lifesharers has yet to die in circumstances
that would permit organ recovery. Id.
101. Ubel, supra note 7, at 207-08 ("Although the program theoretically could
offer up to $3,000 in benefits, the trust fund is unlikely to be large enough to offer
more than $1,000 any time soon."). The small amount was intended "to emphasize
that it is only a token of appreciation, not a strong financial incentive." Id.
102. 20 PA. CONST. STAT. § 8622 (2001).
103. Peters, supra note 83, at 1303.
104. Ubel, supra note 7, at 207-8. See also Joint Letter to Congress, supra note
32 (stating that it is crucial that a gift be of a set amount and given for patients who
are judged to be good donor candidates to avoid "unseemly haggling").
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A funeral benefit incentive also does not compromise the health of
the donor or organ recipient. The donor's health is not compromised
because hospitals are unlikely to change the nature of care for dying
patients.05 Hospitals with non-heart-beating donor protocols are not
permitted to discuss organ donation until family members have made
the decision to withdraw their loved-ones from life-support °6  A
funeral benefit is also unlikely to compromise the quality of organs
harvested and the lives of organ recipients, since cadaveric organ
donation has stringent criteria that would not change because funeral
benefits are paid.' °7
It is important to note that NOTA does not represent a policy which
claims that it is unethical to engage in the buying and selling of human
body parts, only that it is unethical to engage in the buying and selling
of organs from living donors.'08 Individuals and organizations are
permitted to legally engage in the buying and selling of body parts for
medical and scientific research.'" Brokerage in human body parts is
105. Ubel, supra note 7, at 208.
106. Id. Non-heart-beating donors are patients who are "ventilator dependent
but are not diagnosable as brain-dead." Id. When families request that ventilator
support be withdrawn, such patients are then taken to an emergency room to have
their organs procured. Id.
107. Peters, supra note 83, at 1304. See also Developments in the Law - Medical
Technology and the Law: Organ Transplantation, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1614, 1625
(1990) (arguing that a market solution to the organ shortage does not result in
poorer quality organs as did the commerce in blood).
[C]ommercial blood banks generally obtained their blood from
populations that had a higher rate of hepatitis infection and, because of
technological limitations, they could not effectively screen out infected
donors. These limitations do not apply to screening potential organ
donors because screening for inferior or infected tissue is relatively quick
and inexpensive when the "cadaver lies exposed in the hospital treatment
room."
Id. See also Robinson, supra note 93, at 1048-49; Harris & Alcorn, supra note 30,
at 217 (pointing out that the problems with quality and safety of commercial blood
have been resolved due to technological advances in screening). But see Goldberg,
supra note 46 at Al (noting the concern of Dr. Francis L. Delmonico, a
Massachusetts General Hospital transplant surgeon, that "payments could
'undermine the integrity of the donor pool' and would give relatives incentives to
cover up flaws in a potential donor's medical record to get the money").
108. Harris & Alcorn, supra note 30, at 213 (noting the thriving market for
"blood, tissue, and human reproductive cells").
109. Robert Cohen, Body Trade: A Largely Unregulated Commerce in Organs
and Tissues is Alarming Experts, BALT. SUN, Jan. 8, 2006, at 6F ("The law allows
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also unregulated for non-research uses." ° The permissibility of trading
in human body parts underscores the notion that NOTA is primarily
concerned with living donation and living donor welfare.
Pennsylvania's funeral benefit sought to incentivize cadaveric organ
donation, not living, and did not involve the substantial profiteering
that is permitted in the brokerage of human body parts for research
and other medical purposes." Instead, the organs procured would
sustain the life of another and the funeral benefit given for its donation
would be carefully regulated, presenting no risk of compromising
donor health.
A Funeral Benefit is not Exploitative, But Rather, Serves the
Interest of Minorities Uniquely Burdened by the Organ Shortage
Within the concern over marketing in living donor organs, NOTA-
sponsors feared the buying and selling of human organs would result in
exploitation of poor and vulnerable individuals. 2 The drafters feared
that commerce in living donor organs would exploit or wrongfully
propel individuals with financial difficulties to act against their best
interest to benefit affluent individuals who could afford to pay for
organs."3 The wealthy would take advantage of the misfortune of the
organizations and entrepreneurs to charge 'reasonable' acquisition and handling
fees for processing, storing and transporting of body parts.").
110. Annie Cheney, The Resurrection Men, HARPER'S MAG., Mar. 2004, at 45,
47 (cadavers are sold for commercial seminars to demonstrate medical gadgetry
and as raw material for a variety of surgical and cosmetic products). Corpses
generally enter the supply chair for various uses through donations and are
subsequently parceled out to middlemen. Id.; see also Cohen, supra note 109, at 6F
(noting that the body trade takes in hundreds of millions of dollars each year).
111. Nonetheless, some critics object to the use of financial incentives for
cadaveric donation merely on the notion that incentives undermine a respect for
human mortal remains, and that some things "are simply not for sale." Gilbert
Meilaender, 'Strip-mining' the Dead, NAT'L REV., Oct. 11, 1999, at 42, 43 ("To
treat those mortal remains with respect, to refuse to see them as merely in service
of other goods, is our last chance to honor the 'extraterritoriality' of each human
life and to affirm that the human person is not simply a 'part' of a human
community."). Id. at 44. However, one might respond to this critique by pointing
out that organs obtained from a cadaveric donor are not merely in service of other
goods, but in the service of providing life to another human being.
112. See NOTA Hearings, supra note 97.
113. See id. One way impoverished individuals presumably act against their
interests is by underestimating the risk involved in the organ donation when under
financial pressure. See also Calandrillo, supra note 84.
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poor."4 Living donor organ sales arguably also would have a "perverse
distributive impact" where disproportionately poor persons, and often
minorities, would be persuaded to sell, and the wealthy primarily could
afford to buy."5 This scenario would result in a disproportionate
allocation of organs among the rich and poor, and among minorities
• • 116
and non-minorities. In essence, the fear was that if organs became
marketable, the poor would suffer for the sake of the rich.
The NOTA-sponsors feared a for-profit market in living donor
organs."' However, a funeral benefit incentive to increase cadaveric
donation is a proposal of an entirely different nature. A funeral
benefit does not raise the same exploitation concerns, as does an organ
brokerage, for several important reasons. First, the rich are not more
likely to receive an organ than the poor and donors (or donor families)
are not prompted to act against their interest by compromising the
health of their loved-ones. Second, a funeral benefit may particularly
benefit African-Americans, a minority group that has historically
experienced exploitation in the medical setting and which is currentlyS 118
disproportionately burdened by the organ shortage.
A funeral benefit incentive to encourage cadaveric organ donation
does not result in a NOTA-feared scenario where auctions would
direct organs from poor living donors (possibly in developing nations)
to the highest bidder.19 With funeral benefit offerings, rich individuals
in need of an organ would be no more likely than poor individuals to
receive an organ, as allocation would depend on matching, time on the
•. 120l
waiting list, and medical necessity. Family members of limitedfinancial means would also not be in the position of having to act
114. Wilkinson, supra note 92, at 130 (indicating that some ethicists characterize
the exploitation in organ sales as the taking advantage of others' "comparatively
limited range of viable options.").
115. Calandrillo, supra note 84, at 93.
116. Id. (noting that this concern could be more directly characterized as
"distributive injustice;" however, distributive injustice is characterized as
"exploitation" here because a market to procure and allocate organs (it is argued)
disproportionately exploits the poor and minorities as a group by asking them to
shoulder the burden of organ donation while distributing a disproportionate share
of available organs to majority groups).
117. See Sten, supra note 90, at 216.
118. See Danovitch et al., supra note 6, at 905.
119. Ubel, supra note 7, at 208; see also Sten, supra note 90, at 219 (concluding
that a funeral benefit in a form like Pennsylvania's "can exist within the accepted
legal and ethical boundaries that govern the national organ system").
120. Peters, supra note 83, at 1303.
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against their interests by making a decision that could compromise the
health of a loved-one, simply to obtain the funeral benefit, since
discussion about organ donation would only take place once a
121
ventilator-withdrawal decision is made. Rather than being
exploitative, a funeral benefit actually remedies a present inequity
present in the NOTA framework -- where hospitals, medical teams,
and organ transplant providers are permitted to earn thousands of
dollars for each organ transplantation, but families receive nothing for
the deceased's donation.1
2
A funeral benefit incentive avoids the primary exploitation concerns
underlying NOTA, but also may particularly benefit African-
Americans, a minority group especially burdened by the shortage of123
organs. Of the 58,000-plus Americans on the national waiting list for
kidneys, thirty-six percent are African-American, three times their
percentage in the general population.2 4 African-Americans must wait• 125
more than twice as long to get kidneys than Caucasians. Thedisparity in organ transplantation is due to a lack of matchable organs
121. Ubel, supra note 7, at 208.
122. Calandrillo, supra note 84, at 115 (paraphrasing Peter Young, the author
makes the point, "why do we allow hospitals, medical teams, and organ transplant
service providers to make thousands of dollars from each organ donated, yet we do
not permit the families of donors to receive a dime, even for burial costs."). See
also Charles A. Erin & John Harris, An Ethical Market in Human Organs, 29 J.
MED. ETHICS 137, 137 (2003)(noting the hypocrisy in the ethics of buying and
selling organs and other body parts).
123. Ubel, supra note 7, at 206; see also Orly Hazony, Increasing the Supply of
Cadaver Organs for Transplantation: Recognizing that the Real Problem is
Psychological Not Legal, 3 Health Matrix 219, 251-52 (1993)(noting that African
Americans have much to gain from an increase in the supply of organs as they and
are four times more likely to develop kidney disease than white Americans and
represent thirty percent of dialysis patients in the U.S.).
124. Danovitch, supra note 6, at 905.
125. Laura Johannes, Delicate Surgery: In Kidney Quest, New Rules Boost
Chances for Blacks; Reform Seeks to Close Gap in Transplant Wait Times;
Worries About a Downside; Mr. Philips Clears Up Record, WALL ST. J., June 18,
2004, at Al ("The median waiting time for blacks ... is 4.7 years, compared with
about 2.2 years for whites, according to figures for people who got on the list in
1998"). UNOS has recently changed the criteria by which organs are matched with
recipients, allowing organs to go to individuals with mis-matched proteins, favoring
African-Americans. Id. However, the new matching scheme potentially could
result in more organ rejections. Id.
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being procured for African-Americans.126  Research suggests that
African-Americans are less willing to donate a family member's
organs. 2 1 Studies indicate that mistrust of the medical community is a
prime reason for the refusal to donate; this mistrust stems from a fear
of exploitation and a perception that African-American lives are
devalued in the medical setting.
128
Although African-Americans may be less inclined to donate their
family members' organs, a survey on the use of financial remuneration
for organ donation discovered that a significant number of African-
Americans favored some form of payment to families who donate
organs.'2 Such data suggest that many African-Americans would
126. Laura A. Siminoff & Christina M. Saunders Sturm, African-American
Reluctance to Donate: Beliefs and Attitudes about Organ Donation and
Implications for Policy, 10 No.1 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 59, 59-60 (2000).
127. Patrick McNamara et al., Correlates of Support for Organ Donation
Among Three Ethnic Groups, 13 CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION 45, 47 (1999). In a
survey of 6080 respondents, only 22.6 percent of African-Americans reported that
they were very willing to donate their organs after death as opposed to 42.9
percent of whites. Id. See also Siminoff & Saunders Sturm, supra note 123, at 62
("Differences . . . in willingness to donate may be rooted in different attitudes
toward the medical community, the importance or extent of intra-familial
communication about organ donation, and the assumed altruistic basis of the
organ procurement system.").
128. Siminoff & Saunders Sturm, supra note 126, at 64. The belief that African-
Americans are devalued in the medical setting is rooted in the community's
awareness of historical instances, such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, where
unauthorized medical experimentation on African-Americans took place and
continued disparities in the provision of medical care. Id. Research has revealed
"if even one family member shows mistrust of the medical staff, it may be enough
to derail donation." McNamara et al., supra note 127, at 48, 49. Two other
significant factors that tended to discourage donation were a family's failure to
discuss end of life issues and concerns about surgical disfigurement of a relative's
body after donation. Id. See also Hazony, supra note 123, at 253 (noting that
socioeconomic problems and distrust of the medical establishment are components
of the low donation rate for blacks); Paul Delaney, Fighting Myths in a Bid to Get
Blacks to Consider Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1991, at C17 (reporting on
research that suggests distrust in the medical establishment can result in African-
Americans refusing to donate under a perception that there is discrimination in the
selection of organ recipients and that other African-Americans will not benefit by
the organ donation).
129. Siminoff & Sauders Sturm, supra note 126, at 68 (43.2 percent of African
Americans favored payment whereas only 12.9 percent of whites were favorably
disposed to payment). Other surveys suggest that favorabilty to compensation for
organ donation is not just limited to African Americans, but extends to other
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respond to a financial incentive in the form of a funeral benefit, and
the resulting increase in cadaveric organ donation among individuals in
the African-American community could add years of life to the large
number of African-Americans waiting for an organ transplant.13 °
A funeral benefit encouraging organ donation in the African-
American community hardly can be characterized as exploitative in
view of the organ needs and perceptions of many inctividuals within the
African American community. 31 Not only would funeral benefits yield
organs and bring life to the disproportionately high number of African-
Americans on waiting lists, but it also would serve as a gesture on the
part of the medical community (and society) to value the life of the
deceased and deal with the family in a dignified way.
CONCLUSION
With over 90,000 individuals waiting for an organ transplant,'32 and
the waiting list growing longer at twice the rate of the number of
transplants, 133 the time is now for Congress to abandon the purely
altruistic framework of organ donation under NOTA, and allow for
individuals in a general polling sample. A study by UNOS found that fifty-two
percent of the individuals sampled favored some form of compensation for organ
donation. UNOS Report, supra note 60. Another study by UNOS and the NKF
found that forty-eight percent of the sample are in favor of compensation. Id.
(individuals in favor of compensation in each of the studies tended to be male,
younger, and of more modest income). See also Sanford & Rocchiccioli, supra
note 8, at 278.
130. In view of the study's findings, the researchers conclude that valuation of
altruism in the current organ procurement system at the expense of all other values
is questionable and based upon values that reflect the attitudes of whites. Siminoff
& Saunders Sturm, supra note 126, at 68.
131. It is significant to note that the Pennsylvania pilot program to offer a
funeral benefit was passed in response to the organ shortage and, in particular, its
adverse effect on African-Americans. Siegel, supra note 16, at 941. In fact, the
drafter of the Pennsylvania legislation was Bill Robinson, a state representative
whose constituents were primarily African-American. Ubel, supra note 7, at 206.
Such background suggests that a funeral benefit to encourage cadaveric organ
donation is perceived by policy makers as serving the interest of African
Americans. Opponents of financial incentives counter this claim by contending
that incentives directed primarily at the African-American community will prompt
recollection of the "the past experience of 'commerce in bodies' that is
unfortunately a part of our country's history." UNOS Report, supra note 60.
132. See United Network for Organ Sharing Online, http://www.unos.org (last
visited Jan. 15, 2005).
133. See Port, supra note 4, at 843.
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innovative alternatives to ascend to the status quo. Pennsylvania's
funeral benefit incentive is such an innovation. Unfortunately,
Pennsylvania's response to the crisis in organ transplantation has been
inhibited by the ambiguity of federal law and by a policy that was not
intended to reach the use of indirect incentives to encourage cadaveric
organ donation.
Congress must respond by clarifying the NOTA provision banning
the exchange of organs for valuable consideration, by indicating that
valuable consideration does not include a reasonable financial benefit
to the family members of cadaveric organ donors. Congress should
also authorize demonstration projects to examine whether financial
incentives would increase cadaveric organ donation. 34 By taking such
actions, Congress can provide a path for the implementation of plans
like Pennsylvania's novel funeral benefit encouraging cadaveric organ
donation, a plan that enhances the ability of families to honor the lives
of the deceased and helps save the lives of many in need of an organ
transplant.
134. See Arthers, supra note 20, at 1128-29 (arguing that policies favoring
cadaveric organ donation are preferable to policies favoring living donation as
cadaveric donation is of lesser cost and greater potential benefit); Siegel, supra
note 16, at 952 (suggesting that the best way to address the immediate organ
shortage is to administer pilot programs providing incentives for organ donation as
Pennsylvania has sought to do); Sten, supra note 90, at 219 (recommending the use
of a death benefit as it can exist within the accepted legal and ethical boundaries
that govern the national organ system).
